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NOTE  
 
Omnipresent Chemicals: TSCA Preemption in 
the Wake of PFAS Contamination 
FREDERICK A. MCDONALD 
Over the past few decades, studies addressing the harms of 
PFAS have gradually progressed, and now scientists believe 
increased exposure could lead to reproductive defects and a higher 
risk of cancer.  Given the amplified concern surrounding these 
pervasive chemicals, states are proactively filing lawsuits on 
behalf of their citizens and enacting legislation to combat this 
nation-wide contamination epidemic.  However, given the 2016 
Amendment to the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, states 
looking to regulate the manufacturing or looking to ratify a state-
wide ban on the manufacturing of such chemicals may face 
preemption under actions taken by the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency. 
This Note focuses on the possible loss of state autonomy 
with regards to PFAS regulation.  It addresses the issues states 
might face given the restrictive nature of the newly enacted 
preemption provisions of the Toxic Substances Control Act, while 
also examining the Act’s possible deficiencies.  Ultimately, 
recognizing a need for creative solutions outside the scope of 
manufacturing regulations may provide the best solutions for 
states to combat these ubiquitous chemicals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 J.D. Candidate and Productions Editor, Pace Environmental Law Review, 
Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University, 2020; B.S., The College of New 
Jersey (TCNJ), 2016. Winner of the NYSBA 2019 William R. Ginsburg Memorial 
Essay Contest. The author would like to thank Professor Katrina Fischer Kuh for 
assisting in the formulation of this Note topic, and Professor Bridget J. Crawford 
for her invaluable edits. The author would also like to thank the Pace 
Environmental Law Review editors and associates for their work on this Note. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
We stand now where two roads diverge. But unlike the roads in 
Robert Frost’s familiar poem, they are not equally fair. The road 
we have long been traveling is deceptively easy, a smooth 
superhighway on which we progress with great speed, but at its 
end lies disaster. The other fork of the road — the one “less 
traveled by” — offers our last, our only chance to reach a 
destination that assures the preservation of the earth.1 
These words, immortalized in the mid-twentieth century to 
address the indiscriminate use of pesticides, ideologically correlate 
to another class of harmful chemicals known as PFAS.2 While 
concern was surrounding pesticides in the 1900s, PFAS began 
lurking in the shadows of large corporations, slowly proliferating 
into what eventually would be referred to as a nation-wide 
contamination epidemic. Though still shrouded in some mystery, 
PFAS are no longer hidden from society and have been brought to 
the fore as a result of scientific evidence linking increased chemical 
exposure to negative health consequences. As such, states are 
making strides to regulate these pervasive chemicals, but face a 
potential obstacle: federal preemption. 
While preemption has various meanings, the modern legal 
usage refers to the federal government’s constitutional right to 
invalidate state law.3 Rooted in the Supremacy Clause, Article VI 
of the United States Constitution, preemption establishes that 
federal law is the “supreme Law of the Land”4—meaning, states 
 
1. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 277 (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1987) 
(1962). 
2. Perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances (collectively known as 
PFAS) are a family of synthetic compounds not found naturally in the 
environment.  The commonality among these human-made compounds is the 
multiple fluorine atoms.  See Scott Fulton et al., The Use of PFAS at Industrial 
and Military Facilities: Technical, Regulatory, and Legal Issues, 49 ENVTL. L. REV. 
10109, 10111 (2019); see also AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCE & DISEASE REGISTRY, 
AN OVERVIEW OF PERFLUOROALKYL AND POLYFLUOROALKYL SUBSTANCES AND 
INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR CLINICIANS RESPONDING TO PATIENT EXPOSURE CONCERNS 
(2018). 
3. Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, Introduction: Preemption in 
Context, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES’ POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 1, 1 
(Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007). 
4. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which 
3
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are bound by federal decrees. A common concern surrounding such 
notion has been states’ loss of autonomy.5 In other words, once the 
federal government decides to regulate a certain area of law, states 
are typically not permitted to impose contradictory directives. 
Because of this sovereignty issue, “[t]here is a presumption against 
preemption in areas historically regulated by the states.”6 
While some areas of law have been traditionally regulated by 
the states, such as the environmental field,7 not all federal statutes 
supersede state law, and thus, federal and state standards might 
have the capability to operate in the same province.8 In the context 
of environmental statutes, Congress has executed many uniform 
regulations since the 1970s, but has left some flexibility to the 
states to implement additional regulations in ways that reflect 
local particularities.9 For example, the Toxic Substances Control 
Act of 1976 (“TSCA”), for many years, allowed states to enact 
various laws regarding harmful chemicals as a result of the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) facing 
difficulties regulating under TSCA’s principal provision.10 
 
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing 
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). The 
Supreme Court has addressed and provided various interpretations on the 
Supremacy Clause throughout history. See N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 
U.S. 147, 169 (1917) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (illustrating an early example of 
field preemption); see also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 630–34 (1982) 
(discussing how courts must balance conflicts between federal and state statutes 
when Congress has not explicitly placed prohibitions on states); Gibbons v. Ogdon, 
22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
5. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 420 (2003) (“[I]t would 
be reasonable to consider the strength of the state interest, judged by standards 
of traditional practice, when deciding how serious a conflict must be shown before 
declaring the state law preempted.”). 
6. Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental Law: A 
Critical Analysis, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 252 (2000). 
7. See generally Sandra Zellmer, Federal Pre-Emption and Displacement of 
Environmental Statutes and Common Law Claims, in DECISION MAKING IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 96, 102 (LeRoy C. Paddock et al. eds., 2016). 
8. Id. at 98. 
9. See Envtl. Def. Fund, Comparing the 1976 Toxic Substances Control Act to 
the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act, ENVTL. DEF. 
FUND 8 (June 22, 2016), http://blogs.edf.org/health/files/2016/06/Side-by-side-
oldTSCA-newTSCA-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2AH-Z4VM]. 
10. Mark N. Duvall et al., What’s New About the Revised TSCA – Toxic 
Substance Control Act, NAT’L L. REV. (June 2, 2016), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/what-s-new-about-revised-tsca-toxic-
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/4
  
2019] OMNIPRESENT CHEMICALS 143 
However, under the 2016 Amendment to TSCA, states now face 
strict preemption provisions which could drastically affect efforts 
to regulate certain chemicals under existing and future state law.11 
This Note argues that states might be partially preempted 
from regulating PFAS under TSCA, and therefore, should focus on 
implementing corrective solutions, outside the scope of 
manufacturing regulations, in order to overcome preemption. A 
special emphasis will be placed on state and federal regulations 
surrounding perfluorooctanoic acid (“PFOA”) and 
perfluorooctanesulfonic acid (“PFOS”), the most commonly known 
PFAS.12 Part II reviews the historical background and scientific 
properties of PFAS, examining specifically PFOA and PFOS, and 
will address why these chemicals are of concern to states. Part III 
(1) provides a general overview of TSCA prior to the 2016 
Amendment, (2) an overview of the new preemption provisions 
after its Amendment, and (3) an examination of whether the 
amended preemption provisions could result in a revival of the 
nondelegation doctrine. Part IV examines the EPA’s efforts to 
combat PFAS and whether the states might be in a period of 
preemption. Part V compares existing state measures regarding 
PFAS. Part VI examines (1) possible methods to avoid preemption, 
(2) alternatives to TSCA’s exceptions provision, and (3) other 
means to regulate PFAS while still complying with TSCA. 
II. OVERVIEW OF PFAS THROUGH A 
HISTORICAL EXAMINATION OF PFOA AND 
PFOS, THE MOST COMMONLY RECOGNIZED 
PFAS 
A. Scientific Properties and Historical Perspective 
PFAS incorporate a large quantity of different chemicals used 
for industrial purposes. From a technical standpoint, such group of 
chemicals have been described as “a diverse class . . . characterised 
 
substances-control-act [https://perma.cc/93KP-LZDF] (noting that “EPA has 
regarded TSCA’s principal control provision. . .as unworkable”). 
11. See Kalyn Behnke, Toxic Preemption: Why the Lautenberg Chemical 
Safety Act’s Erosion of State Authority Contaminates Environmental Law, 57 
JURIMETRICS J. 459, 460 (2017). 
12. PFAS Contamination of Water, STATE OF RHODE ISLAND DEP’T OF HEALTH, 
http://www.health.ri.gov/water/about/pfas/ [https://perma.cc/DK49-L7ZW]. 
5
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by a hydrophobic alkylated chain saturated with fluorine atoms, 
usually attached to a hydrophilic head.”13 More simply, the 
structure of PFAS, which has lipid properties and water-resistant 
properties, makes these substances ideal for commercial uses.14 Of 
the thousands of PFAS in existence, PFOA and PFOS are the two 
most well-known types, which materialized back in the mid-
twentieth century.15 
PFOA is a synthetic compound with a chain length of eight 
carbons and hence, is often referred to as “C8.”16 The chemical “is 
used in the form of salts in the production of fluoropolymers, which 
have special properties in manufacturing and industrial 
applications, such as fire resistance, and oil, stain, grease, and 
water repellence.”17 PFOA is most commonly associated with 
Teflon,18 another name for the human-made chemical PTFE.19  
Known for its stability, Teflon has most commonly been used in 
pans and other cookware because of its non-stick coating 
capabilities.20 Teflon does not contain PFOA, but rather, PFOA is 
used to make Teflon and is a byproduct of Teflon production.21 
PFOS is fairly similar to PFOA in that both chemicals contain 
eight carbons.22 The chemical is produced synthetically from 
 
13. M. Clara et al., Emissions of Perfluorinated Alkylated Substances (PFAS) 
from Point Sources—Identification of Relevant Branches, 58 WATER SCI. & TECH. 
59, 59 (2008). 
14. Id. 
15. See INTERSTATE TECH. REGULATORY COUNCIL, HISTORY AND USE OF PER- 
AND POLYFLUOROALKYL SUBSTANCES (PFAS) 1 (Nov. 2017), https://pfas-
1.itrcweb.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/11/pfas_fact_sheet_history_and_use__11_13_17.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q5F9-U7XE]. PFOA and PFOS are just two of roughly 3,000 
chemicals part of the PFAS family. Id. 
16. NICHOLAS P. CHEREMISINOFF, PERFLUORINATED CHEMICALS: 
CONTAMINANTS OF CONCERN 49–50 (2017). 
17. Id. at 50. Some of the common industrial sectors that use PFOA include 
aerospace, automotive, building/construction, chemical processing, electronics, 
semiconductors, and textile industries. Id. 
18. CALLIE LYONS, STAIN-RESISTANT, NONSTICK, WATERPROOF, AND LETHAL: 
THE HIDDEN DANGERS OF C8 2 (2007). 
19. Teflon and Perfluorooctanoic Acid (PFOA), AM. CANCER SOC’Y (Jan. 5, 
2016), https://www.cancer.org/cancer/cancer-causes/teflon-and-perfluorooctanoic-
acid-pfoa.html [https://perma.cc/C9T2-JZ4T]. 
20. Id.; see also LYONS, supra note 18, at 1 (Teflon is used in household 
cleaning products and beauty items). 
21. AM. CANCER SOC’Y, supra note 19. 
22. See CHEREMISINOFF, supra note 16, at 44. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/4
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perfluorooctane sulfonyl fluoride (“PFOSF”), which is used for 
production of C8 compounds.23 PFOS substances have been 
manufactured for roughly five decades, and their unique properties 
are ideal for manufactured products such as firefighting foams24 
and surface resistance or repellence to oils, water, and grease.25 
Factors contributing to PFAS contamination began as early as 
1938 when Dr. Roy J. Plunkett, a research chemist, accidentally 
stumbled onto what is often referred to as “the miracle of Teflon.”26 
The discovery was made during the early stages of Dr. Plunkett’s 
work with DuPont, an American conglomerate responsible for the 
development of numerous polymers throughout the twentieth 
century.27 For years, and in order to produce Teflon, DuPont 
purchased PFOA from 3M, which had been the main corporation 
manufacturing the chemical since the 1940s.28 
Around the same time that PFOA was making its way into the 
manufacturing process of various Teflon related products, PFOS 
became a key ingredient in stain repellants, such as Scotchgard.29 
Similar to Dr. Plunkett’s accidental discovery, Patsy Sherman, a 
chemist for 3M, developed Scotchgard while trying to create a 
 
23. Id. 
24. Stephen H. Korzeniowski et al., Fluorosurfactants in Firefighting Foams: 
Past and Present, in PERFLUOROALKYL SUBSTANCES IN THE ENVIRONMENT: THEORY, 
PRACTICE, AND INNOVATION 3, 13 (David M. Kempisty et al. eds., 2019) (noting that 
fluorosurfactants [another name for PFAS] were used as firefighting foam 
agents). 
25. Kavitha Dasu et al., Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substance Analysis to 
Support Site Characterization, Exposure, and Risk Management, in 
PERFLUOROALKYL SUBSTANCES IN THE ENVIRONMENT: THEORY, PRACTICE, 
INNOVATION, supra note 24, at 40. 
26. LYONS, supra note 18, at 1. 
27. Roy J. Plunkett, Historical Biographies, SCI. HISTORY INST. (Dec. 14, 
2017), https://www.sciencehistory.org/historical-profile/roy-j-plunkett 
[https://perma.cc/ZYF8-9AMX]. 
28. Sharon Lerner, 3M Knew About the Dangers of PFOA and PFOS Decades 
Ago, Internal Documents Show, THE INTERCEPT (July 31, 2018, 12:33 PM), 
https://theintercept.com/2018/07/31/3m-pfas-minnesota-pfoa-pfos/ 
[https://perma.cc/HR5C-JTPZ]. 
29. See Jonathon W. Martin et al., PFOS and PreFOS? Are Perfluorooctane 
Sulfonate Precursors (PreFOS) Important Determinants of Human and 
Environmental Perfluorooctane Sulfonate (PFOS) Exposure?, 12 J. ENVTL. 
MONITORING 1979, 1982 (2010). 
7
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rubber that would not deteriorate from exposures to jet fuel.30 
Sherman’s discovery lead to the first manufactured Scotchgard 
product, which contained PFOS.31 
B. States continued concern over PFOA and PFOS 
Chemicals, and why regulation of additional PFAS 
is desired 
Studies have shown that while DuPont and 3M continued to 
reap the benefits of their products that contained or used various 
PFAS, both companies began to accumulate information on the 
hazardous effects surrounding PFOA and PFOS.32 Discovery of 
dangerous consequences from exposure to these chemicals began 
as early as the 1960s, finding that animals experienced adverse 
effects to PFOA and PFOS.33 By the 1970s, such chemicals were 
found to be present in the blood of 3M and DuPont workers.34 The 
most alarming realization, given the unknown consequences of 
human exposure at the time, was the presence of these chemicals 
in the blood of nearly every worker in facilities manufacturing 
PFAS.35 As the years progressed, studies from these corporations 
showed that not only were company workers plagued with 
exposure to these chemicals, but animals, not tested in labs, had 
traces of the compounds in their blood as well.36 It became clear 
that PFAS were infecting surrounding environments (e.g., water 
and air) and was not contained solely to the factories producing the 
chemicals.37 
 
30. Susan Borowski, Scientific Breakthroughs that Were Accidents, AM. ASS’N 
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., 3P2Yhttps://www.aaas.org/scientific-
breakthroughs-were-accidents [https://perma.cc/9CVW-3P2Y]. 
31. Id. 
32. Poisoned Legacy: From Lab Accident to Global Pollutant, ENVTL. 
WORKING GRP. (May 1, 2015), https://www.ewg.org/research/poisoned-legacy/lab-
accident-global-pollutant [https://perma.cc/P2DN-NBTL]. 
33. Id.; see also LYONS, supra note 18, at 4 (studies have shown that animals 
exposed to PFOA developed a variety of cancers, including liver, pancreas, breast, 
and testicular). 
34. ENVTL. WORKING GROUP, supra note 32; see generally THE DEVIL WE KNOW 
(Netflix 2018) (recounting how PFAS infected a West Virginia community and 
individuals working in 3M and DuPont factories). 
35. ENVTL. WORKING GROUP, supra note 32. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/4
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While some PFAS are no longer manufactured in the United 
States today, such as PFOA and PFOS, states still have an 
increasing concern over the health effects and environmental 
impacts caused from years of exposure.38 PFAS are ubiquitous in 
the environment and human body, do not break down easily, and 
can accumulate over time.39 Specifically, these substances are 
found in the air, soil, and water.40 While the chemical break down 
is quicker in the air, PFAS do not break down at all once it enters 
the water and soil.41 
Individuals face exposure to PFAS through the air breathed 
and sometimes indoor contact from dust and household products.42  
The most common form of exposure comes from eating food and 
drinking water which contain these chemicals.43 While scientific 
studies continue, it is believed that PFAS may “affect growth, 
learning, and behavior of infants and older children, lower a 
woman’s chance of getting pregnant, interfere with the body’s 
natural hormones, increase cholesterol levels, affect the immune 
system, [and] increase the risk of cancer.”44 Interestingly enough, 
individuals throughout the world face these potential health risks, 
as studies show that nearly everyone has traces of the chemicals 
in their blood.45 
Because of the continued concern over PFAS, states are taking 
two forms of action. The first involves numerous states filing 
lawsuits against manufacturers of PFAS, such as DuPont and 
 
38. See Basic Information on PFAS,  EPA, https://www.epa.gov/pfas/basic-
information-pfas [https://perma.cc/W7NN-NN3L]. 
39. Id. 
40. AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, PER- AND 
POLYFLUOROALKYL SUBSTANCES (PFAS): FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2018), 
https://www.health.ny.gov/environmental/investigations/drinkingwaterresponse/
docs/atsdr_pfas_factsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/FMU2-AXCF]. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS) and Your Health: PFAS 
Health Effects, AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY (Jan. 10, 
2018), https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/pfas/health-effects.html [https://perma.cc/AS4S-
EZ3K]; see also CHEREMISINOFF, supra note 16, at 66, 77. 
45. AM. CANCER SOC’Y, supra note 19; see THE DEVIL WE KNOW, supra note 34 
at 21:58–22:14. 
9
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3M.46 In particular, Minnesota47 and New York48 are two states 
asserting actions on behalf of their citizens, with Minnesota 
achieving a multimillion-dollar settlement. Many consider these 
chemicals to be the “next PCB” because of the bioaccumulation 
affects and the realization that such chemicals will not leave the 
body.49 As a result, it is no surprise that litigation is being used as 
a remedial mechanism that will likely continue for many years to 
come.50 
The second curative approach to the epidemic involves states 
enacting laws and promulgating regulations to ban 
manufacturing.51 While states have a right to be concerned over 
these chemicals and hope to implement effective laws and 
regulations, the new provisions under TSCA might preempt such 
efforts.52 As a result, states must examine TSCA closely to 
determine whether a continuance or the establishment of certain 
statutes are viable options.53 
 
46. See Matthew Thurlow et al., PFAS Contamination Remains a Hot-Button 
Issue: Overview of Recent Regulatory, Litigation, and Technical Developments, 19 
ENVTL. LITIG. & TOXIC TORTS COMM. NEWSL. (Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Env’t., 
Energy & Res., Chicago, IL), Apr. 2018, at 19, 21. 
47. See generally Amended Complaint at 1, State of Minnesota v. 3M Co., No. 
27-CV-10-28862 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 19, 2011) (complaint sought damages under 
MERLA, damages under MWPCA, damages for trespass, damages for common 
law nuisance, damages for statutory nuisance, and damages for negligence). This 
case settled for $850 million and the money will be used to finance projects that 
involve drinking water and water sustainability. See Tiffany Kary, 3M Settles 
Minnesota Lawsuit for $850 Million, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 20, 2018, 3:53 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-20/3m-is-said-to-settle-
minnesota-lawsuit-for-up-to-1-billion [https://perma.cc/F366-4J74]. 
48. See generally Complaint at 1, State of New York v. 3M Co., No. 904029-
18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 19, 2018) (complaint asserts cause of action for public 
nuisance, strict products liability for defective design, and strict products liability 
for failure to warn, in addition to a restitution claim). 
49. Tiffany Kary, To the EPA, ‘Forever Chemicals’ Are a Big Problem Now, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/to-the-
epa-forever-chemicals-are-a-big-problem-now/2019/02/13/d9a75104-2f64-11e9-
8781-763619f12cb4_story.html [https://perma.cc/SSS7-W4WF]. 
50. Individuals are also bringing private actions against manufacturers of 
PFAS. See id. 
51. Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS): State Legislation 2017-
2018, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF ST. LEGISLATURES (June 29, 2016), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/environment-and-natural-resources/per-and-
polyfluoroalkyl-substances-pfas-state-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/LAW2-9W24]. 
52. Behnke, supra note 11, at 466–67. 
53. Id. at 467. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/4
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III. OVERVIEW OF THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES 
CONTROL ACT 
A. The Toxic Substances and Control Act of 1976 
Congress adopted TSCA in 1976 in order to “prevent 
unreasonable risks of injury to health or the environment 
associated with manufacture, processing, distribution in 
commerce, use, or disposal of chemical substances.”54 “TSCA 
promised to: (1) create an inventory of existing chemicals and 
require the premanufacture review of any chemical not included 
on this inventory; (2) require chemical manufacturers and 
processors to develop data on the health and environmental effects 
of their chemicals; and (3) restrict or require labeling on chemicals 
that present unreasonable risks.”55 Proponents of TSCA believed 
that the statute would avoid the need for further federal 
regulations.56 However, many scholars criticized TSCA for years, 
claiming that the EPA was unable to effectively utilize the statute 
for Congress’ intended purpose.57 
Scholars identified three predominant gaps in U.S. chemical 
policy, resulting from TSCA’s weaknesses: a (1) data gap, (2) safety 
gap, and (3) technology gap.58 The alleged data gap was a product 
of not requiring producers to examine and divulge information on 
hazardous traits of chemicals to the government, public, or 
 
54. S. REP. NO. 94-698, at 1 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491, 
4491; see also David Markell, An Overview of TSCA, Its History and Key 
Underlying Assumptions, and Its Place in Environmental Regulation, 32 WASH. 
U. J. L. & POL’Y 333, 338 (2010) (noting the purpose of the original TSCA 
enactment). 
55. Jessica N. Schifano et al., The Importance of Implementation in 
Rethinking Chemicals Management Policies: The Toxic Substances Control Act, 
41 ENVTL. L. REP. 10527, 10528 (2011). 
56. 1977 COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY ANN. REP. 1, 347. 
57. Michael P. Wilson & Megan R. Schwarzman, Toward a New U.S. 
Chemicals Policy: Rebuilding the Foundation to Advance New Science, Green 
Chemistry, and Environmental Health, 117 ENVTL. L. HEALTH PERSP. 1202, 1202 
(2009) (claiming the statute has “prevented government, businesses, and the 
public from a) assessing the hazard traits of the great majority of chemicals in 
commerce; b) controlling chemicals of significant concern; and c) motivating broad 
industry investment in cleaner chemical technologies and safer alternatives, 
known collectively as green chemistry.”). 
58. Id. 
11
  
150 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
businesses that used said chemicals.59 This gap illustrates how 
companies, such as 3M and DuPont, avoided liability for their 
injection of PFAS into the environment for years. Distinguishably, 
the safety gap was premised on the idea that the EPA lacked legal 
tools to “identify, prioritize, and take action to mitigate potential 
health and environmental effects of hazardous chemicals.”60 
Finally, the supposed technology gap relied on the notion that the 
government did not invest sufficiently in research, development, 
and education.61 Because of these gaps and the EPA’s inability to 
review safety components, hundreds of dangerous chemicals 
entered the market.62 
Another believed contributing factor to the original TSCA’s 
failure was the landmark asbestos decision, Corrosion Proof 
Fittings v. EPA.63 Beginning in 1979, the EPA reviewed hundreds 
of asbestos studies and conducted public meetings, resulting in an 
asbestos ban.64 The Fifth Circuit ultimately vacated the asbestos 
ban promulgated by the EPA on both procedural and substantive 
grounds.65 Procedurally, the court concluded that the EPA failed 
to give the public sufficient notice.66 Generally speaking, the EPA 
was required to “give notice as to its intended methodology while 
the public still has opportunity to analyze, comment, and influence 
the proceedings.”67 Substantively, the court concluded that the 
EPA failed to abide by TSCA’s less burdensome alternatives for 
addressing unreasonable risks, failed to determine alternatives to 
a complete ban, and failed to assess risks with potential 
substitutes.68 Because of the Fifth Circuit’s holding, legal 
commentators have viewed the original TSCA as imposing 
particularly high evidentiary hurdles for EPA regulators to 
 
59. Id. The data gap prevented the EPA from instituting more than 
voluntary measures to act on early indicators of harm. Id. at 1202–04. 
60. Id. at 1202. 
61. Id. 
62. A New Chemical Safety Law: The Lautenberg Act, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, 
https://www.edf.org/health/policy/chemicals-policy-reform 
[https://perma.cc/E2SJ-HPKY]. 
63. 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). 
64. Id. at 1207. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 1212. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 1229–30. 
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overcome.69 Some commentators have gone as far as saying that 
the decision inflicted the most damage to the EPA’s ability to 
regulate chemical substances.70 With the court’s remand of the 
asbestos ban, there seemed to be an assumption that the EPA 
might want to avoid rulemaking altogether in order to prevent 
another debacle like the asbestos ban.71 
Although intended to create a healthier, safer environment for 
society, the original TSCA failed for numerous reasons. As such,  
Congress implemented a supposedly more effective act to correct 
these statutory weaknesses.72 
B. The Toxic Substances and Control Act Amendment: 
Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st 
Century Act 
In 2016, Congress enacted the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical 
Safety for the 21st Century Act (“LCSA”), an amendment to the 
Toxic Substances and Control Act of 1976.73  At its core, the 
Amendment was in response to TSCA being “woefully out of step 
with the best and latest science relating chemical exposures to 
human health.”74 A driving motivation for the Amendment was to 
alleviate the EPA from a classic catch-22 situation, where the strict 
 
69. LINDA-JO SCHIEROW, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34118, THE TOXIC 
SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT (TSCA): IMPLEMENTATION AND NEW CHALLENGES 17 
(2009). 
70. Robert B. Haemer, Reform of the Toxic Substances Control Act: Achieving 
Balance in the Regulation of Toxic Substances, 6 ENVTL. L. 102, 116 (1999). 
71. Id. at 118. (“The fact that the court found ten years of rulemaking and a 
45,000 page record inadequate to support a ban on asbestos makes it appear that 
EPA management has good reason to avoid rulemaking altogether.”); see also 
Mark A. Greenwood, TSCA Reform: Building a Program that Can Work, 39 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10034, 10034 (2009) (“In the early 1990s, when the courts rejected 
EPA’s comprehensive ban on asbestos, TSCA became widely known as a ‘broken’ 
statute.”). 
72. See Behnke, supra note 11, at 464. 
73. See The Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act: A 
More Effective Way to Regulate Chemicals in Commerce, AM. CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, 
https://www.americanchemistry.com/LCSA-Learn-
More.pdf[https://perma.cc/8ALU-5TW8]. 
74. Richard A. Denison, A Primer on the New Toxic Substances Control Act 
(TSCA) and What Led to It, ENVTL. DEF. FUND 1 (Apr. 2017), 
https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/denison-primer-on-lautenberg-act.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JXD2-EZ65]. 
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standards of the original TSCA led to the testing of only a few 
hundred chemicals.75 
Among the major revisions from LSCA is Section 18, which 
addresses preemption over state law.76 Prior to the amendment, 
though legally feasible, the original TSCA did not often trigger 
preemption.77 Now, preemption under LSCA has sparked major 
debate over whether it is too strict and ultimately prevents state 
autonomy given the abundance of state regulations.78 
The revised Section 18 sets forth all-purpose conditions for 
which states and political sectors are not permitted to establish or 
continue the enforcement of statutes, administrative actions, or 
criminal penalties.79 LSCA provides that states can no longer 
establish or enforce the following: (1) development of 
information,80 (2) chemical substances found not to present an 
unreasonable risk or restriction,81 and (3) significant new use.82 
Broadly speaking, LSCA restrictions preclude state effort when the 
EPA proclaims a new rule that addresses identified risks posed by 
a chemical or determines, through a risk evaluation, that certain 
chemicals do not pose an unreasonable risk to the public.83 
Additionally, such preemptive conditions do not occur until the 
“effective date of the applicable action described. . .by the 
Administrator.”84 However, if the EPA has failed to address a new 
 
75. Id. at 3. 
76. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2617 (2018). 
77. See, e.g., Hudson Riverkeeper Fund, Inc. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 138 F. 
Supp. 2d 482, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting that TSCA did not apply, but 
nonetheless, detailed the isolated instances when preemption would be triggered). 
78. See generally LISA R. BURCHI, Section 18 – State-Federal Relationship, in 
NEW TSCA: A GUIDE TO THE LAUTENBERG CHEMICAL SAFETY ACT AND ITS 
IMPLEMENTATION 207, 207 (Lynn L. Bergeson & Charles M. Auer eds., 2017); see 
also Charles Franklin et al., Pesticides, Chemical Regulation, And Right-To-
Know, in ABA ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY, & RESOURCES LAW: THE YEAR IN REVIEW 
2016 74, 76 (ABA Env’t, Energy, & Res., 2016). 
79. See BURCHI, supra note 78, at 207–08. 
80. 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A). 
81. Id. at § 2617(a)(1)(B). 
82. Id. at § 2617(a)(1)(C). 
83. Id. at § 2617(a)(1). 
84. Id. at § 2617(a)(2) (a section 6 determination will need to be made). An 
example of this is “when a Section 4 rule is issued in final, not when it is 
proposed.” BURCHI, supra note 78, at 208. 
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chemical, states are not preempted unless, or until, the EPA takes 
the chemical under its existing authority.85 
In addition to the three categories of preemptive measures 
listed above, Section 18 also hinders state effort through what is 
referred to as “pause preemption.”86 Unlike other preemption 
provisions, pause preemption might only be temporary.87 This 
timing condition mandates when statutes, criminal penalties, or 
administrative actions cannot be enacted by states or political 
subdivisions.88 Simply put, under 15 U.S.C. § 2617(b), no actions 
regarding a chemical may be established, “once the EPA defines 
the scope of a risk evaluation . . . and until the earlier of either: (1) 
the dead-line established under [15 U.S.C. § 2605(b)(4)(G)] for 
completion of the risk evaluation expires or (2) the date on which 
the EPA publishes the risk evaluation under TSCA [15 U.S.C. 
§ 2605(b)(4)(C)].”89 This provision is referred to as pause 
preemption because it provides a time frame for when states are 
preempted from acting.90 It does not, however, prohibit state action 
while the EPA deliberates over whether a chemical might pose an 
unreasonable risk.91 The chemical must be designated as “a high-
priority substance” to fall under pause preemption.92 Additionally, 
pause preemption will not occur when the EPA is “preparing risk 
evaluations for the initial batch of 10 Work Plan chemical 
substances,”93 the first ten chemicals selected in 2016 to be 
evaluated under the new TSCA amendments. 
 
85. See Denison, supra note 74, at 8. 
86. See 15 U.S.C. § 2617(b); BURCHI, supra note 78, at 209; see also The Frank 
R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act: Frequent Questions, EPA 
(Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-
10/documents/lautenberg_chemical_safety_for_the_21st_century_act_update_fa
qs_102416_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/TC3B-V8S3] [hereinafter Frequent Questions]. 
87. 15 U.S.C. § 2617(b)(1). 
88. Id. 
89. BURCHI, supra note 78, at 209. 
90. See 15 U.S.C. § 2617(b)(1); BURCHI, supra note 78, at 209 (“[F]or example, 
before the scope of a risk evaluation is defined or even after EPA determines in a 
risk evaluation that a chemical presents an unreasonable risk but before a final 
Section 6(a) rule based on the risk evaluation is issued.”). 
91. BURCHI, supra note 78, at 209. 
92. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(b)(1)(B)(i). 
93. Frequent Questions, supra note 86 (“i.e., those that must be identified 
under 6(b)(2)(A)” or 15 U.S.C. § 2605(b)(2)(A)). Under TSCA reform, the EPA 
listed ten chemicals that would be evaluated first for potential risks to human 
health and the environment. News Release, EPA, EPA Names First Chemicals 
15
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While the implementation of LSCA came with strict 
preemption provisions, the amendment also created exceptions to 
preemption along with the preservation of certain state laws. In 
regard to exceptions, LSCA does not preempt states from enacting 
or enforcing rules, standards of performance, risk evaluation, 
scientific assessment, or any other protection for public health or 
the environment, if such enactment falls within one of four 
categories: (1) adopted or authorized under a different federal law 
or approved by another federal law,94 (2) implements reporting, 
monitoring, or other information obligation for the chemicals not 
required by the EPA under any other federal law,95 (3) adopted 
under state law which relates to water quality, air quality, or waste 
treatment or disposal (subject to exceptions),96 or (4) is identical to 
the EPA’s requirement.97  However, the exception involving 
adopting regulations of chemicals under other state law imposes 
three limitations: (1) state action cannot impose restriction of 
manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, or use of a 
chemical substance,98 and (2) addresses the same hazardous issues 
as the EPA, but does not reach the same conclusion,99 or (3) would 
cause a violation of the EPA’s action under Section 2604 
(manufacturing and processing notices) or Section 2605 
(prioritization, risk evaluation, and regulation of chemical 
substances and mixtures).100 
As noted, LSCA allows for the preservation of certain 
preexisting state laws and regulations.101 Specifically, state efforts 
taken prior to April 22, 2016, which prohibit or impede 
“manufacturing, processing, distribution in commerce, use, or 
disposal of a chemical substance” are not preempted.102 
Additionally, any action taken pursuant to a state law that was in 
 
for Review Under New TSCA Legislation (Nov. 29, 2016), 
https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-names-first-chemicals-
review-under-new-tsca-legislation_.html [https://perma.cc/EQ9N-93JC]. 
94. 15 U.S.C. § 2617(d)(1)(A)(i). 
95. Id. at § 2617(d)(1)(A)(ii). 
96. Id. at § 2617(d)(1)(A)(iii). 
97. Id. at § 2617(d)(1)(A)(iv). 
98. Id. at § 2617(d)(1)(A)(iii)(I). 
99. Id. at § 2617(d)(1)(A)(iii)(I)(aa). 
100. Id. at § 2617(d)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(bb). 
101. Id. at § 2617(e). 
102. Id. at § 2617(e)(1)(A). 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/4
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effect on or prior to August 31, 2003, is not preempted.103 For 
example, California’s Proposition 65, enacted in 1986,104 would be 
protected from preemption because of its ratification date. 
Another significant change is the waivers provision.105 Prior 
to the 2016 amendment, TSCA could waive federal preemption 
under two situations: (1) the state or political subdivision 
requirement would not unduly burden interstate commerce, or (2) 
the state or political subdivision requirement would provide a 
significantly higher degree of protection from risks described in the 
section titled “Preemption.”106 Now, the waiver process has become 
more complex, resulting in discretionary and non-discretionary 
waivers.107 
The discretionary provision permits the EPA to exempt a 
statute, criminal penalty, or administrative action of a state or 
political subdivision108 from preemption only if the federal 
government makes several determinations: (1) compelling 
conditions (e.g., protection of health and environment) exist to 
grant the waiver;109 (2) complying with a proposed requirement of 
a state or political subdivision would not “unduly burden interstate 
commerce” in the manufacturing, distribution in commerce, or use 
of a chemical substance;110 (3) complying would not result in a 
violation of any applicable federal laws;111 and (4) the proposed 
requirement of the state or political subdivision is consistent with 
paramount science, supported by studies conducted with “sound 
and objective practices,” and based on scientific evidence.112 
With regard to the non-discretionary provision, the EPA is 
directed to exempt from the pause preemption provision113 a 
statute or administrative action that relates to the effect of 
exposure to chemical substances under conditions if the following 
 
103. Id. at § 2617(e)(1)(B). 
104. See Proposition 65, CAL. OFF. OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, 
https://oehha.ca.gov/proposition-65 [https://perma.cc/Z4KR-A7RV]. 
105. 15 U.S.C. § 2617(f); see also Envtl. Def. Fund, supra note 9, at 10. 
106. S. 3149, 94th Cong. § 18(b)(1)–(2) (as passed by 2nd Session, 1976). 
107. See 15 U.S.C. § 2617(f). 
108. Id. at § 2617(f)(1). 
109. Id. at § 2617(f)(1)(A). 
110. Id. at § 2617(f)(1)(B). 
111. Id. at § 2617(f)(1)(C). 
112. Id. at § 2617(f)(1)(D)(i)–(iii). 
113. Id. at § 2617(b). 
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is determined: (1) complying with a proposed requirement would 
not “unduly burden interstate commerce” with regard to 
manufacturing, processing, distributing in commerce, or use of 
chemical substance; (2) complying with a proposed requirement 
would not cause a violation of a federal law, rule, or order; and (3) 
the State or political subdivision has concerns regarding the 
chemical substance or use of the substance based on peer-reviewed 
science.114 Additionally, the EPA must waive pause preemption 
when a statute or proposed administrative action, intending to 
prohibit or restrict “the manufacture, processing, distribution in 
commerce, or use of the chemical substance,” was enacted within 
eighteen months after the EPA prioritized or published the scope 
of the risk evaluation for the chemical substance.115 
Determinations of discretionary and non-discretionary 
waivers must be made no later than 180 days and 110 days, 
respectively, after the application for a waiver is submitted.116 
When a decision by the EPA is not made within the 110 days for a 
non-discretionary waiver, the federal statute or administrative 
action that preempts states is considered non-existing, and the 
state or political subdivision will automatically receive a waiver.117 
C. Constitutionality of LSCA 
Though many believe that LSCA corrected numerous 
shortcomings of the original TSCA, overly strict preemptive 
provisions have legislators and scholars concerned about the 
states’ ability to regulate chemicals.118 Because of the country’s 
increased concern over the restrictive nature of the new TSCA, an 
examination of whether the statute delegates too much power to 
the EPA is necessary. 
 
114. Id. at § 2617(f)(2)(A)(i)-(iii). 
115. Id. at § 2617(f)(2)(B). 
116. Id. at § 2617(f)(3)(A)-(B). 
117. See id. at § 2617(f)(4).  If the State or political subdivision automatically 
receives the waiver, the statute or administrative action will not be considered 
preempted, forcing the EPA to abide by these deadlines or face consequences. Id. 
at § 2617(f)(9)(A)-(B); see also BURCHI, supra note 78, at 214. 
118. See generally David Goldston, Not ‘Til the Fat Lady Sings: TSCA’s Next 
Act, 33 ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. 1, 1 (2016). 
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Under the United States Constitution, Congress has the 
exclusive right to exercise federal legislative power.119 The 
Constitution prohibits Congress from asserting such powers if it 
would exceed the scope of Article I.120 Additionally, allocating 
legislative authority to the executive or judicial branches of 
government is prohibited under the nondelegation doctrine as such 
concept is “rooted in the principle of separation of powers that 
underlies our tripartite system of Government.”121 However, “[i]f 
Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle 
to . . . the person or body authorized . . . such legislative action is 
not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.”122  This exception 
focuses on the degree of discretion Congress may entrust to the 
executive branch’s federal regulators.123 
The Supreme Court addressed the question of power delegated 
to federal regulators in Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns.124 In 
Whitman, the Supreme Court examined a provision of the Clean 
Air Act (“CAA”), and addressed whether such provision violated 
the nondelegation doctrine.125 The lower court found that the 
statute provided too much discretion to the EPA to determine air 
quality standards.126 The Supreme Court reversed and affirmed in 
part finding that 
[s]ection 109(b)(1) of the CAA, which to repeat we interpret as 
requiring the EPA to set air quality standard at a level that is 
“requisite”—that is, not lower than is necessary—to protect the 
public health with an adequate margin of safety, fits comfortably 
within the scope of discretion permitted by our precedent.127 
 
119. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be 
vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and 
House of Representatives.”). 
120. U.S. CONST. amend X. (“The powers not delegated to the United States 
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”). 
121. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989). 
122. J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). 
123. Id. at 407. 
124. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
125. Id. at 463. 
126. Id. at 472. 
127. Id. at 475–76. 
19
  
158 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
Though agreeing with the majority’s overall outcome on the issue, 
in his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas noted the 
potential for violation of the nondelegation doctrine with regard to 
congressional actions that appear to meet the intelligible doctrine 
test.128  Justice Thomas further opined that he was “not convinced 
that the intelligible principle doctrine serves to prevent all cessions 
of legislative power . . . there are cases in which the principle is 
intelligible and yet the significance of the delegated decision is 
simply too great for the decision to be called anything other than 
‘legislative.’”129 To address his potential concern, Justice Thomas 
indicated that the Court should reexamine whether the “delegation 
of jurisprudence. . .strayed too far from our Founders’ 
understanding of separation of powers” at some later date.130 
Whitman is just one of many cases where the Supreme Court 
upheld the delegation of power to federal regulators.131 Because of 
cases like Whitman, it is unlikely courts would find justification to 
invoke the nondelegation doctrine in the context of TSCA.132 
Congress avoids the invocation of the nondelegation doctrine if, 
instead of providing the EPA free reign to make law,  it authorizes 
the regulators to flesh out details of law;133 thus, in doing so, 
Congress provides agencies vast discretionary authority.134 
With the enactment of LSCA, Congress detailed its intent to 
protect the environment and individuals from potentially harmful 
 
128. Id. at 487. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 486; see, e.g., Dep’t. of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R., 135 S. Ct. 
1225, 1234 (2015) (failing to enforce nondelegation doctrine and remanding for 
further consideration); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425-26 (1944) 
(finding that the Administrator’s authority to fix prices was not an unauthorized 
delegation of power); Nat’l Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225–
26 (1943) (finding an intelligible principle authorizing regulation in public 
interest, convenience, or necessity). 
132. In its most recent review of delegated authority, the Supreme Court 
once again failed to invoke the nondelegation doctrine. See Gundy v. United 
States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019). The most recent invocations of the nondelegation 
doctrine occurred in the 1930s. See generally A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 
429-30 (1935). 
133. William K. Kelley, Justice Scalia, the Nondelegation Doctrine, and 
Constitutional Argument, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2111 (2017). 
134. Id. at 2110. 
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manufactured chemicals.135 Additionally, as described in Section 
B of Part III of this Note, Congress specified preemption guidelines 
for the EPA to enforce upon the states. The preemption situations 
include, when the EPA has made a new development of 
information,136 when the EPA finds that chemical substances do 
present an unreasonable risk,137 or when the EPA promulgates a 
significant new use.138 As such, Congress did not empower the EPA 
to establish these restrictive preemption provisions, but rather, 
provided the guidelines for effectively limiting state action while 
the federal government conducts examinations of harmful 
chemicals.  If Congress provided little guidance under the 
preemption statute and the EPA began to invoke federal 
preemption over states, such a situation might spark the Supreme 
Court to revive the nondelegation doctrine, as the EPA would 
effectively be establishing its own guidelines to minimize state 
action. 
However, while it appears that Congress did not violate the 
nondelegation doctrine, it is still possible that the TSCA 
preemption provisions impose a situation that is too great for 
“anything other than [the] ‘legislat[ure].’”139 Environmental law is 
an area typically regulated by the states, since states have the 
potential to provide additional resources to combat emerging 
problems.140 While the states traditionally have more regulatory 
power with regard to environmental law, the nondelegation 
doctrine’s lack of use to invalidate a statute since the 1900s141 
suggests that Justice Thomas’ concern will not be addressed in the 
context of TSCA. 
 
135. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2629 (2018). 
136. Id. at § 2617(a)(1)(A). 
137. Id. at § 2617(a)(1)(B). 
138. Id. at § 2617(a)(1)(C). 
139. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
140. See Zellmer, supra note 7, at 98. 
141. See generally A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 
495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
21
  
160 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
IV. FEDERAL REGULATIONS OF PFAS UNDER 
TSCA 
A. The EPA’s Regulatory Scheme of PFAS 
While assistance from the judicial branch seems unlikely in 
providing a corrective solution to the preemption provisions, states 
may still have the ability to regulate PFAS without violating 
TSCA. Regulation of such chemicals will depend on whether the 
EPA has taken sufficient measures to trigger the preemption 
provisions. Specifically, the EPA designating chemicals to be a 
“high-priority”142 or an “unreasonable risk”143 to society will 
indicate preemption. Additionally, state statutes that require the 
development of information that the EPA will have already 
produced under current TSCA provisions will be preempted.144 
States can also be preempted when a state regulatory action 
contradicts a Significant New Use Rule (“SNUR”) promulgated by 
the EPA.145 Thus the question becomes: are the EPA’s actions to 
date enough to preempt state regulatory effort? 
As previously addressed, PFAS have long been recognized as 
chemicals found in manufactured goods, water supplies, and the 
air. Because these chemicals were found to be harmful to both the 
environment and individuals, the EPA has taken a variety of 
regulatory actions to address the manufacturing of PFAS.146 
Beginning in 2002, the EPA published various SNURs, including 
a requirement to notify the EPA before manufacturing or 
importing certain PFAS which were part of the voluntary phase 
out by 3M.147 Chemicals that were highly technical, and could not 
be substituted, were allowed for limited use.148 That same year, 
the EPA issued a SNUR for seventy-five PFAS, which required 
manufacturers or importers to notify the EPA ninety days before 
 
142. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(b)(1)(B)(i). 
143. Id. at § 2617(a)(1)(B). 
144. Id. at § 2617(a)(1)(A). 
145. Id. at § 2604(a). 
146. Risk Management for Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS) 
Under TSCA, EPA  (July 20, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/assessing-and-
managing-chemicals-under-tsca/risk-management-and-polyfluoroalkyl-
substances-pfass [https://perma.cc/SW3J-EDFP]. 
147. Id.; see also Korzeniowski, supra note 24, at 6. 
148. EPA, supra note 146. 
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manufacturing or importing the specified PFAS.149 Both SNURs 
from 2002 required a review process by the EPA for any other use 
of the specific PFAS listed.150 
In 2006, the EPA invited eight leading companies in the PFAS 
industry to join its stewardship program with two primary goals: 
[1)] [to] commit to achieve, no later than 2010, a 95 percent 
reduction, measured from a year 2000 baseline, in both facility 
emissions to all media of perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA), precursor 
chemicals that can break down to PFOA, and related higher 
homologue chemicals, and product content levels of these 
chemicals. [2)] To commit to working toward elimination of these 
chemicals from emissions and products by 2015.151 
EPA progress reports reflect that all eight companies met the two 
goals;152 some companies simply eliminated manufacturing uses of 
the chemicals, while others left the PFAS industry all together.153 
Finally, in 2013, the EPA issued another SNUR requiring all 
companies that sold carpets to report uses of certain PFOA-related 
chemicals if the chemicals were in the manufacturing process or if 
the chemical would be used in imported carpets.154 
With regard to current actions, in January 2015, the EPA 
proposed a SNUR that would require manufacturers and importers 
of PFOA and PFOA-related chemicals to notify the EPA at least 
ninety days before starting or resuming use of these chemicals in 
 
149. EPA, EPA’S PER- AND POLYFLUOROALKYL SUBSTANCES (PFAS) ACTION 
PLAN 48 (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-
02/documents/pfas_action_plan_021319_508compliant_1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YJL2-L9KU]. 
150. See EPA, supra note 146. 
151. Fact Sheet: 2010/2015 PFOA Stewardship Program, EPA (Aug. 9, 
2018), https://www.epa.gov/assessing-and-managing-chemicals-under-tsca/fact-
sheet-20102015-pfoa-stewardship-program#what [https://perma.cc/ZWN7-
SDFE].  The companies that participated in the program included: Arkema, 
Asahi, BASF Corporation (successor to Ciba), Clariant, Daikin, 3M/Dyneon, 
DuPont, and Solvay Solexis. Id. 
152. Id.; see also 2010/2015 PFOA Stewardship Program – 2014 Annual 
Progress Reports, EPA (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.epa.gov/assessing-and-
managing-chemicals-under-tsca/20102015-pfoa-stewardship-program-2014-
annual-progress [https://perma.cc/ED89-NCQ4]. 
153. See EPA, supra note 151. 
154. See EPA, supra note 146; see also EPA, supra note 149, at 48. 
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products.155 Such notification would provide the EPA time to 
evaluate the new use and take necessary actions to prohibit or 
limit activity.156 Additionally, the EPA has enacted the New 
Chemicals Program where the review of potential substitutes to 
PFAS is conducted.157 This program requires testing consistent 
with TSCA provisions158 and “restricts uses pending development 
of an adequate understanding of the chemical’s fate and effects . . . 
and requires that the substitutes not be contaminated significantly 
with longer chain-length perfluorinated substances of concern.”159 
Companies that manufacture a new chemical for non-exempt 
commercial purposes must notify the EPA under this program.160 
If the chemical is listed on the TSCA inventory, the substance is 
not considered new, but rather existing;161 therefore, no 
submission to the EPA would be necessary.162 
Most recently, on February 14, 2019, the EPA released the 
first ever nationwide PFAS Action Plan.163 One of the EPA’s major 
proposals is to issue a regulatory determination which would 
potentially result in a new Maximum Contaminant Level (“MCL”) 
for PFOA and PFOS under the Safe Drinking Water Act.164 
Additionally, the EPA plans to revisit the 2015 SNUR proposal 
after considering public comments recently submitted,165 as well 
as designate PFOA and PFOS as hazardous substances.166 Though 
 
155. EPA, supra note 146. 
156. Id. 
157. New Chemicals Program Review of Alternatives for PFOA and Related 
Chemicals,  EPA (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/assessing-and-managing-
chemicals-under-tsca/new-chemicals-program-review-alternatives-pfoa-and 
[https://perma.cc/UJR2-2SJH]. 
158. 15 U.S.C. § 2604(e) (2018). 
159. EPA, supra note 157. 
160. Basic Information for the Review of New Chemicals, EPA (May 18, 
2017), https://www.epa.gov/reviewing-new-chemicals-under-toxic-substances-
control-act-tsca/basic-information-review-new#new%20chemical 
[https://perma.cc/PQ2H-UD34]. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
163. News Release, EPA, EPA Acting Administrator Announces First-Ever 
Comprehensive Nationwide PFAS Action Plan (Feb. 14, 2019), 
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-acting-administrator-announces-first-
ever-comprehensive-nationwide-pfas-action-plan [https://perma.cc/6TS6-WZFG]. 
164. See EPA, supra note 149, at 2. 
165. Id. at 16. 
166. Id. at 28. 
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historic in nature and seemingly progressive at first glance, many 
states believe the EPA’s Action Plan is not addressing the 
continued concerns of PFAS at a swift enough pace.167 As a result, 
states that desire a more proactive approach to combatting PFAS 
must determine whether the EPA’s actions sufficiently trigger 
preemption under TSCA. 
B. Are states preempted from enacting regulations? 
In light of the EPA’s regulatory practices with PFAS, states 
face the question of whether they may regulate these chemicals or 
whether federal action preempts their efforts. Based on the EPA’s 
actions discussed in Section A of Part III of this Note, states may 
very well be facing preemptive measures. 
Of the two main categories, pause preemption appears to be 
the most straightforward. In order to invoke pause preemption, the 
EPA must initiate a risk evaluation process to appraise the safety 
of an existing chemical.168 The first step in the risk evaluation 
process is prioritizing an existing chemical.169 Though the EPA has 
made several strides in regulating PFAS over the years, such 
chemicals are on a should prioritize list.170 In other words, the EPA 
has not officially started the risk evaluation process that would 
place states in a pause preemption period. Even if pause 
preemption was initiated, some states could still regulate PFAS if 
 
167. See Cecelia Smith-Schoenwalder, Frustrated by EPA, States Blaze 
Ahead on PFAS, E&E NEWS (Mar. 4, 2019), 
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060123043 [https://perma.cc/B9MH-Z8KZ]; see, 
e.g., Wheeler’s Nationwide PFAS Action Plan Fails Communities, EARTHJUSTICE 
(Feb. 14, 2019), https://earthjustice.org/news/press/2019/wheeler-s-nationwide-
pfas-action-plan-fails-communities [https://perma.cc/9U78-ZKYN]. 
168. See BURCHI, supra note 78, at 209. 
169. Prioritizing Existing Chemicals for Risk Evaluation, EPA (last updated 
Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.epa.gov/assessing-and-managing-chemicals-under-
tsca/prioritizing-existing-chemicals-risk-evaluation [https://perma.cc/JZF7-
HBKF]. 
170. EPA, OFFICE OF CHEMICAL SAFETY AND POLLUTION PREVENTION, A 
WORKING APPROACH FOR IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL CANDIDATE CHEMICALS FOR 
PRIORITIZATION 1 (Sep. 27, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-
09/documents/preprioritization_white_paper_9272018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PHM6-6QB9]. 
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a pre-existing law was in existence within a specified time period 
(e.g., California).171 
Overcoming the pause preemption hurdle is not as steep as the 
three provisions listed under Section 18.172 The second portion of 
Section 18, “Chemical substances found not to present an 
unreasonable risk or restricted,”173 does not seem to be at issue 
regarding PFAS. As mentioned, even though the EPA has taken 
numerous steps to eliminate the manufacturing of some PFAS, 
there is no indication that PFAS have been designated as posing 
an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment, and 
further, no formal risk evaluation has been undertaken.174 
However, where states face the greatest hurdle lies within the 
first portion of Section 18, “Development of Information.”175 Under 
the first portion of Section 18, if “[a] statute or administrative 
action that would require the ‘development of information’ that is 
‘reasonably likely to produce the same information required’ under 
a TSCA Section 4, 5, or 6 rule, consent agreement, or order,” such 
state effort would be impermissible and preempted by federal 
law.176 Because the first portion of Section 18 provides the 
potential for states to face preemption via three different 
provisions, an examination of all three is necessary. 
First, while studies show that PFAS do pose harmful risks to 
health and the environment, testing is still necessary to provide 
definitive answers.177 As a result, current state laws requiring a 
development of information would not “produce the same data” 
under Section 4, as no such data pursuant to section 4 exists—the 
federal government has not developed definitive statistics 
regarding PFAS. Second, Section 5, which deals with SNURs, will 
 
171. 15 U.S.C. § 2617(e)(1)(B) (2018) (noting actions taken pursuant to State 
law prior to August 31, 2003, will not be preempted). 
172. Id. at § 2617(a)(1). 
173. Id. at § 2617(a)(1)(B). 
174. See generally PFAS Laws and Regulations, EPA (July 30, 2018), 
https://www.epa.gov/pfas/pfas-laws-and-regulations [https://perma.cc/6D9M-
8SUN]. 
175. 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A). 
176. See BURCHI, supra note 78, at 208. 
177. See EPA Pressed to Use ‘Discretionary’ TSCA Authority to Address 
PFAS, CHEMICAL WATCH (Nov. 8, 2018), https://chemicalwatch.com/71712/epa-
pressed-to-use-discretionary-tsca-authority-to-address-pfass#overlay-strip 
[https://perma.cc/BPJ6-YJFP]. 
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be addressed more specifically in the following paragraph, but it 
appears such section may be a problem. Third, Section 6 requires 
the EPA to have taken risk management steps for states to be 
preempted.178 The EPA has not prioritized PFAS yet,179 which 
means the risk management process has yet to begin.180 As a 
result, until the EPA designates PFAS as not an unreasonable risk 
or promulgates a rule addressing the identified risks posed, states 
are not preempted from enacting laws to regulate PFAS under 
Section 6. 
The third portion of Section 18, “Significant New Use,”181 is 
the likely source for current state preemption. As discussed, the 
EPA proposed a SNUR in 2015 that would require manufacturers 
and importers of PFOA and PFOA-related chemicals to notify the 
EPA at least ninety days before starting or resuming use of these 
chemicals in products.182 This proposal has not been enacted yet 
as the EPA is currently working on a re-proposal that requires both 
compliance with requirements of TSCA and an analysis of public 
commentary.183 If this proposal goes through, it could put certain 
state regulation at risk of preemption. Specifically, states that 
have initiated, or are in the process of enacting complete bans on 
PFAS, could be in direct conflict with this SNUR if the EPA 
permits certain types of PFAS to be reintroduced to the 
manufacturing process. 
Though the 2015 SNUR could be a problem, states currently 
must examine prior SNURs, starting from 2002. SNURs ranging 
from 2002 through 2013 require parties to notify the EPA for the 
reasons of future manufacturing and future importing of certain 
PFAS.184 However, these SNURs do not encompass every PFAS. 
As such, states that enact complete bans on PFAS would likely face 
preemption for the particular PFAS listed in the SNURs ranging 
 
178. See Regulations of Chemicals Under Section 6(a) of the Toxic Substances 
Control Act, EPA (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/assessing-and-managing-
chemicals-under-tsca/regulation-chemicals-under-section-6a-toxic-substances 
[https://perma.cc/27AE-YHGP]. 
179. See generally EPA, supra note 170. 
180. See EPA, supra note 169. 
181. 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(C) (2018). 
182. See EPA, supra note 151. 
183. See EPA, supra note 149, at 16. 
184. See id. at 12. 
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from 2002 through 2013185 because a complete ban would mean 
those specified PFAS would not have the option for potential future 
use; thus, a complete ban would be in direct conflict with the 
SNURs.  Under SNURs from 2002 to 2013, the EPA could allow 
specified PFAS to be reintroduced into the manufacturing and 
importation process. Therefore, it appears that states are partially 
preempted—states likely cannot regulate PFAS listed in SNURs 
ranging from 2002 through 2013. 
V. COMPARISON OF STATE LAW AND WHETHER 
THERE SHOULD BE A CONCERN OF FACING 
TSCA’S PREEMPTION PROVISIONS IN THE 
FUTURE. 
Although it appears the EPA has initiated enough regulation 
to partially preempt governing actions, states should be mindful of 
the possibility that preemption could eventually completely hinder 
future regulatory efforts. As previously discussed, LSCA 
implemented provisions that exempt certain state actions from 
federal preemption, if such actions meet specific dates.186 When 
LSCA was enacted, consideration was given to certain states, such 
as California, in order to preserve existing legislation that had 
played important roles in chemical regulations. However, some 
states, such as West Virginia, may face difficulties now and in the 
future. 
A. California 
California’s Proposition 65, officially known as the Safe 
Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, is one of a few 
grandfathered state laws protected from TSCA preemption.187 The 
 
185. See generally Perfluoroalkyl Sulfonates; Significant New Use Rule, 67 
Fed. Reg. 11008–13 (Mar. 11, 2002); 67 Fed. Reg. 72854–67 (Dec. 9, 2002); 72 Fed. 
Reg. 57222–35 (Oct. 9, 2007); 72 Fed. Reg. 62443-204 (Oct. 22, 2013). 
186. 15 U.S.C. § 2617(e)(1); see also What is Preempted and Not Preempted 
Under the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act, ENVTL. 
DEF. FUND (2016), http://blogs.edf.org/health/files/2016/05/Preemption-under-
FRL21-5-23-16-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/PN3T-M2YD]. 
187. CAL. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, NEW FEDERAL TOXICS LAW COULD 
HAVE FUTURE IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE, (Oct. 5, 2016), 
https://lao.ca.gov/Publications/Report/3504 [https://perma.cc/WS2X-KVZ3]. 
Massachusetts’ Toxic Use Reduction Act is another grandfathered legislation. See 
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California law, in part, was enacted to safeguard the state’s 
drinking water from chemicals known to have various negative 
consequences, including birth and reproductive defects and 
cancer.188 Because of the ubiquitous and persistent nature of 
PFAS, California added two specific types, PFOS and PFOA, to 
Proposition 65’s list of chemicals known to cause reproductive 
toxicity.189 Since the chemicals were added to this list, “companies 
doing business in California with 10 or more employees will be 
required to provide a ‘clear and reasonable’ warning before 
knowingly and intentionally exposing anyone to PFOA or 
PFOS.”190 Even more pressure will fall on companies that are 
unable to prove the need for these chemicals as they will face 
damaging legal consequences. For instance, civil penalties for the 
use of these substances can reach as high as $2,500 per violation 
each day.191 Companies that use these PFAS regularly for 
manufacturing purposes could be looking at upwards of a million 
dollars for one year if only one violation occurs each day.192 Due to 
the legal risks associated with PFAS in the manufacturing process, 
businesses are recommended to examine the amount of PFAS 
exposure their products encounter regularly and transition to 
PFAS-free equipment and supplies.193 
Even though it appears the EPA triggers preemption under 
TSCA, various implementations from California to date will not be 
disturbed. As previously addressed, California is safe from nearly 
all preemption under TSCA as long as PFAS regulation is brought 
 
generally, COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., MASSDEP TOXICS USE REDUCTION PROGRAM 
(2019), https://www.mass.gov/guides/massdep-toxics-use-reduction-program 
[https://perma.cc/UUZ7-9J62]. 
188. See CAL. OFF. OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, supra note 104. 
189. Perfluorooctane Sulfonate (PFOS), CAL. OFFICE OF ENVTL. HEALTH 
HAZARD ASSESSMENT (2019), https://oehha.ca.gov/proposition-
65/chemicals/perfluorooctane-sulfonate-pfos-and-its-salts 
[https://perma.cc/D7AJ-976F]; Perfluorooctanoic Acid (PFOA), CAL. OFFICE OF 
ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT (2019), https://oehha.ca.gov/proposition-
65/chemicals/perfluorooctanoic-acid-pfoa-and-its-salts [https://perma.cc/3UPM-
45VG]. 
190. Jeffery Dintzer & Nathaniel Johnson, INSIGHT: PFAS Liability Is 
Coming to California, BLOOMBERG ENV’T & ENERGY (Oct. 31, 2018, 7:01 AM), 
https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-energy/insight-pfas-
liability-is-coming-to-california [https://perma.cc/EX3Y-EZQL]. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
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under Proposition 65. For instance, California properly noted that 
PFOS and PFOA chemicals were added to the Proposition 65 list 
because of the known reproductive defects. Proposition 65 was 
specifically enacted to regulate chemicals that have reproductive 
consequences194 and therefore, any regulation of at least PFOS and 
PFOA would fall within the scope of the legislative act. Since 
California enacted this legislation prior to August 31, 2003,195 the 
State has created a safe haven for most future regulations 
involving PFAS.  However, if California wants to regulate PFAS 
other than PFOA and PFOS, the State should individually list 
these additional chemicals under Proposition 65. 
B. West Virginia 
While California is merely one of numerous states already 
addressing PFAS contamination,196 other states, which might 
enact new state regulations or rely on current state regulations to 
combat PFAS, may be unable to avoid preemption under TSCA. 
Specifically, West Virginia could fall within the category of 
unprotected states susceptible to preemption. Typically, West 
Virginia is not known for being a green state, and has few 
implemented environmental protections.197 Fewer protections 
might leave West Virginia vulnerable to TSCA’s strict preemption 
provisions. 
Following the EPA’s lifetime advisory warning of certain 
PFAS, West Virginia’s Bureau for Public Health published an 
announcement regarding health concerns.198 Other than the 
publication addressing the EPA’s advisory, West Virginia has yet 
to employ corrective solutions to PFAS problems, even though the 
 
194. See CAL. OFF. OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, supra note 104. 
195. 15 U.S.C. § 2617(e)(1)(B) (2018). 
196. See Bill Tracker, SAFER STATES, http://www.saferstates.com/bill-
tracker/ [https://perma.cc/B8LQ-X5NR]. New York has proposed legislation to ban 
the manufacture and sale of food packaging containing PFAS. See States in the 
Lead: New York, SAFER STS., http://www.saferstates.com/states-in-the-lead/new-
york/ [https://perma.cc/XFZ6-CSYW]. 
197. See John S Kiernan, 2018’s Greenest States, WALLETHUB (Apr. 15, 2019), 
https://wallethub.com/edu/greenest-states/11987/ [https://perma.cc/KBY7-LSYJ]. 
198. See W. VA. BUREAU FOR PUBLIC HEALTH, PERFLUORINATED COMPOUNDS 
DRINKING WATER HEALTH ADVISORY (2016), 
https://www.wvdhhr.org/oehs/documents/BPH_pfoa%20pfos_FL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/87PU-C5NX]. 
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state is one of the most affected by PFAS contamination.199 As 
such, it would appear that if West Virginia were to initiate a state 
effort addressing PFAS, it could be preempted.200 The complicated 
issue to consider is whether West Virginia would be able to 
regulate PFAS under an existing law enacted prior to August 31, 
2003.201 The answer is uncertain. Assuming that West Virginia 
relies on its Hazardous Waste Management Act,202 the state could 
address the management of chemicals and possible hazardous 
products which might be of concern.203 However, while the statute 
purports to maintain public health and safety to the environment, 
it appears to focus more on the management of hazardous wastes 
or chemicals, with minimal attention devoted to the manufacturing 
process.204 
Given the broad nature of the statute, it is difficult to provide 
a definitive answer as to whether the state’s reliance on the 
Hazardous Waste Management Act is sufficient to withstand 
preemption; the question becomes, are the words “manufacturing” 
and “management” synonymous? If manufacturing and 
management are indistinguishable, or if the statute is deemed 
sufficient with regard to manufacturing regulation, West Virginia 
could likely avoid preemption under its Hazardous Waste 
Management Act so long as PFAS regulation is listed under the 
Act, similar to California’s listing of certain PFAS under 
Proposition 65. Although, since West Virginia has not addressed 
PFAS concerns, it could be reasonably found that the Hazardous 
Waste Management Act is not meant for the regulation of such 
chemicals. Consequently, West Virginia might be a preempted 
state without an escape avenue. 
 
199. See generally Brittany Patterson, EPA Pledges to Limit Public Exposure 
to Chemicals Like C8, W. VA. PUBLIC BROAD. (May 22, 2018), 
https://www.wvpublic.org/post/epa-pledges-limit-public-exposure-chemicals-
c8#stream/0[https://perma.cc/E2X8-YK7G]. 
200. 15 U.S.C. § 2617(e)(1)(A). 
201. Id. at § 2617(e)(1)(B). 
202. W. VA. CODE § 22-18-2 (2019). 
203. Id. at § 22-18-2(b)(2). 
204. Id. at § 22-18-2(b)(1). 
31
  
170 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
VI. CORRECTIVE SOLUTIONS TO IMPENDING 
PREEMPTION 
A. TSCA Exceptions and Waivers 
As previously addressed in Part II of this Note, LSCA carved 
out protections from preemption in the form of exceptions and 
waivers. Unfortunately, neither appears to provide adequate 
solutions to the restrictive nature of TSCA. As such, states should 
be aware of nuances surrounding these provisions. 
Under TSCA, states are not preempted: (1) if a regulation is 
adopted pursuant to another federal law; (2) if a regulation 
provides for monitoring or reporting not required by the EPA; or 
(3) if a regulation is adopted pursuant to a state water, air, or waste 
treatment law.205 However, option three is limited to the extent 
that it does not impose restrictions on manufacturing, processing, 
distribution in commerce, or use of a chemical substance, and 
either (a) addresses the same hazardous issues as the EPA, but 
does not reach the same conclusion, or (b) would cause the EPA to 
violate other portions of the statute.206 
Option one and two do not require much attention or analysis. 
TSCA is the main federal regulation concerning the manufacturing 
and distribution of certain chemicals. As such, it is unlikely other 
federal manufacturing laws would provide stricter provisions for 
PFAS that can compete with state actions looking to completely 
ban PFAS. Similarly, with option two, it is unlikely a state will 
require monitoring different from the EPA, as the EPA tends to 
look to states for guidance in order to understand health effects 
associated with hazardous chemicals.207 As such, whatever 
standards states establish will likely be on point with the federal 
government once the EPA initiates additional PFAS protections. 
Option three poses a solution to regulating chemicals, but may 
also prove unavailing. Regulating through other means (i.e., water 
laws), discussed in the next section, would be a positive solution to 
 
205. 15 U.S.C. § 2617(d)(1)(A)(i)–(iii). 
206. Id. at § 2617(d)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(aa)–(bb). 
207. See, e.g., News Release, EPA, EPA Seeks Public Input on Draft Toxicity 
Assessments for PFAS Chemicals (Nov. 14, 2018), 
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-seeks-public-input-draft-toxicity-
assessments-pfas-chemicals [https://perma.cc/V35Z-DDZ9]. 
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preemption. However, under the TSCA provision, it would mean 
adopting water, air, or waste disposal treatment laws that would 
effectively reduce the manufacturing of PFAS.208 Regulating 
through other state laws is challenging as the TSCA provision has 
limitations, particularly that the state air, water, or waste disposal 
law cannot restrict manufacturing.209 
If states are facing preemption under TSCA, the overarching 
issue must be the manufacturing with or manufacturing of a 
certain chemical, as the purpose of TSCA’s enactment was to 
“prevent unreasonable risks of injury to health or the environment 
associated with the manufacture, processing, distribution in 
commerce, use, or disposal of chemicals substances.”210 
Consequently, it would not matter that states rely on other laws to 
reduce the manufacturing of PFAS, because those laws would 
violate 15 U.S.C. § 2617(d)(1)(A)(iii)(I). Even if an argument could 
be made that the manufacturing itself would not be affected, 
regulations under other laws would still likely violate 15 U.S.C. 
§ 2617(d)(1)(A)(iii)(I) as (1) the processing of a product and (2) the 
use of the chemical substance would be restricted.211 Additionally, 
if states were to rely on other authority (water, air, or waste 
disposal), it could not restrict distribution in commerce. 
Distribution in commerce means “trade, traffic, transportation, or 
other commerce (1) between a place in a State and any place 
outside of such State, or (2) which affects trade, traffic, 
transportation, or commerce between a place in a State and any 
place outside of such State.”212 In essence, if states rely on other 
laws, which would likely be more restrictive on PFAS use, 
distribution in commerce would clearly be affected as those states 
would probably not allow any products manufactured with PFAS 
to be distributed within state borders. Therefore, the exceptions 
 
208. 15 U.S.C. § 2617(d)(1)(A)(iii) (2018). 
209. Id. at § 2617(d)(1)(A)(iii)(I). 
210. Markell, supra note 54, at 338 (quoting S. REP. No. 94-698, at 1 (1976), 
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491, 4491). 
211. See generally Toxic Chemicals: PFAS, SAFER STS., 
http://www.saferstates.com/toxic-chemicals/pfas/ [https://perma.cc/LKL8-QMB3]. 
212. 40 C.F.R. § 720.3 (2016). 
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provision of TSCA is not an effective solution to avoiding 
preemptive measures.213 
In addition to exceptions, states have the ability to obtain a 
waiver. Waivers, too, are ineffective solutions for states because 
both discretionary and non-discretionary waivers cannot impose 
an undue burden on interstate commerce.214 In United States v. 
Lopez, the Supreme Court found that interstate commerce is 
affected by commercial activity.215 Unlike Lopez, where the mere 
possession of a handgun was found to not affect interstate 
commerce,216 it would be difficult to argue that providing states 
with waivers, which limit the manufacturing of PFAS, would not 
have some sort of effect on interstate commerce. PFAS are used to 
manufacture various products, such as stain repellants217 and 
carpets.218 These are items meant to be distributed in commerce. 
If states want to reduce or eliminate the use of PFAS through a 
waiver from the federal government, manufacturing would be 
greatly limited and could result in a product not making its way to 
the market. As a result, a waiver under TSCA, which in the context 
of PFAS would allow states to reduce or limit use of the chemicals 
during the manufacturing process, could impose an undue burden 
on interstate commerce. 
B. Regulation through Water Provisions 
Because the exceptions and waivers under TSCA do not 
appear as workable escapes from preemption, states should focus 
less on regulating the manufacturing of PFAS and emphasize 
corrective solutions to limit the levels of these chemicals in water 
supplies. As addressed briefly in the preceding section, TSCA 
 
213. As addressed in Part IV of this Note, the EPA has not officially begun 
the risk management process, thus the second prong of 15 U.S.C. 
§ 2617(d)(1)(A)(iii) is not currently at issue, and therefore, will not be addressed 
in this note. See id. at § 2617(d)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(aa). 
214. Id. at § 2617(f)(1)–(2). 
215. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995). 
216. Id. at 567. 
217. See LYONS, supra note 18, at 109 (Scotchgard is an example of a well-
known stain repellant that once contained PFOS, a type of PFAS). 
218. See CAL. DEP’T OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL, DISCUSSION DRAFT: 
PRODUCT – CHEMICAL PROFILE FOR PERFLUOROALKYL AND POLYFLUOROALKYL 
SUBSTANCES (PFASS) IN CARPETS AND RUGS 4–5 (2018). 
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exceptions pose an interesting solution to regulating chemicals: 
regulation through water laws. The problem again with regulating 
chemicals through other means is that such regulation cannot limit 
manufacturing, processing, distribution in commerce, use or 
disposal of chemicals substances.219 A method of bypassing those 
restrictions would be to not regulate manufacturing, but rather use 
state water laws to regulate water systems and operators. Water 
systems and operators have no impact on the manufacturing of 
PFAS, but rather, can assist in the purification process of water 
supplies contaminated with PFAS. 
Additionally, the EPA has established very limited water 
guidelines, which means states have flexibility when it comes to 
regulating water systems and operators, so long as the regulations 
do not contradict section 15 U.S.C. § 2617(d)(1)(A). Currently, the 
EPA has only provided a health advisory maximum contamination 
level of seventy parts per trillion.220 However, EPA health 
advisories are both non-enforceable and solely provide technical 
guidance to states and public health officials with regard to 
potential health effects.221 Some states have adopted the EPA’s 
advisory222 while others, such as New Jersey, have taken more 
aggressive measures to ensure the safety of its citizens and the 
environment.223 
States like New York are at the forefront of combatting PFAS, 
and such actions may provide guidance to other states. 
Particularly, in 2016, Governor Cuomo created the Water Quality 
 
219. 15 U.S.C. § 2617(d)(1)(A)(iii)(I). 
220. Drinking Water Health Advisories for PFOA and PFOS, EPA (last 
updated Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.epa.gov/ground-water-and-drinking-
water/drinking-water-health-advisories-pfoa-and-pfos [https://perma.cc/GG5S-
2MLY]. 
221. Drinking Water Contaminate Human Health Effects Information, EPA 
(Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.epa.gov/dwstandardsregulations/drinking-water-
contaminant-human-health-effects-information [https://perma.cc/7PQR-QZDT]. 
222. See Cole Alder, Analysis of state-by-state differences in PFAS regulation, 
NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY: SOC. SCI. ENVTL. HEALTH RES. INST. (Oct. 2, 2018), 
https://pfasproject.com/2018/10/02/analysis-of-state-by-state-differences-in-pfas-
regulation/ [https://perma.cc/G5V9-FGFX] (noting states that have adopted the 
EPA’s suggested standard). 
223. Drinking Water Facts: Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS) in 
Drinking Water, N.J. DEP’T OF HEALTH 2 (2017), 
https://www.nj.gov/health/ceohs/documents/pfas_drinking%20water.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HRX9-LZ69] (New Jersey has enforced standards that do not 
allow PFAS to exceed 14 ppt for drinking water). 
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Rapid Response Team to investigate water contamination across 
New York and to take remedial actions to address drinking water 
issues across the state.224 In 2017, Governor Cuomo enacted the 
Clean Water Infrastructure Act, which put $2.5 billion towards 
enhancing New York’s efforts.225 The Act will provide support to 
help communities upgrade drinking water and wastewater 
infrastructures with modern filtration systems and connect 
contaminated private water wells to regulated public systems.226 
Such measures can hopefully sieve out PFAS or at least minimize 
the amount of PFAS getting through the filtration systems. While 
New York’s actions appear costly, it is a possible option to avoid 
preemption under TSCA. These regulations do not appear to imply 
any sort of limitation on manufacturing and would therefore likely 
be immune from a preemption challenge. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The ubiquitous nature of PFAS has resulted in country-wide 
contamination. States are currently taking steps to minimize 
human exposure and reduce the quantity of these chemicals found 
in the environment. However, even though the federal government 
continues to drag its feet with enforceable PFAS standards, 
preemption has likely been triggered with the implementation of 
SNURs ranging from 2002 through 2013. As such, states should 
act now with regard to unregulated PFAS or hope there is some 
state provision to rely on, since the exceptions and waivers sections 
of TSCA are not ideal solutions. This Note does not recommend an 
amendment to TSCA, but rather, provides awareness of the 
preemption provisions and the resulting effect on PFAS 
manufacturing regulation. 
While reducing the manufacturing use of these harmful 
chemicals provides a fast solution to the contamination problem, 
states must be realistic about federal government assistance given 
 
224. Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS), N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. 
CONSERVATION, https://www.dec.ny.gov/chemical/108831.html 
[https://perma.cc/5L9P-8Z4Z]. 
225. Id. 
226. Id.; see also New York State’s Water Quality Rapid Response Team 
Continues Actions to Address Water Contamination Statewide, N.Y. DEP’T OF 
ENVTL. CONSERVATION (Jan 31, 2017), https://www.dec.ny.gov/press/109114.html 
[https://perma.cc/SR5N-WK4S]. 
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its lack of initiative. Regulating water systems and operators is 
another effective solution to decreasing the level of exposure to 
humans and the environment. Through an adoption of 
preventative procedures, states can take the “other fork of the 
road—the one ‘less traveled’”227 to effectively begin remediation of 
an inadequately addressed problem, and ultimately combat the 
continued spread of these harmful, omnipresent chemicals. 
 
 
 
227. CARSON, supra note 1, at 277. 
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